Phase 0 milestone 0.2: vendor OWC framework + YPMS pii_audit

Brings in a working generic-CRUD framework plus its dependencies from OWC
(../owc-system/src/owc/, snapshot 2026-04-20). Every vendored module carries
a header comment naming the source; the OWC → ypms rename is the only
mechanical change.

Vendored modules:

- framework/base.py           TimestampMixin, SoftDeleteMixin, VersionedMixin
- framework/pagination.py     Page[T] with to_dict()
- framework/version_history.py  Snapshot table
- framework/crud.py           CRUDService with audit emission
- framework/bulk.py           BulkOps (BulkResult / BulkUpdateItem)
- framework/router.py         make_router() factory (kept without
                              `from __future__ import annotations` for
                              FastAPI type introspection — see the module
                              docstring)
- audit/models.py             AuditLog
- audit/service.py            record()
- security/models.py          Permission
- security/rbac.py            can() + require_permission() dependency
                              (DOES_SYSTEM_ADMIN as the super-role)
- users/models.py             User, Role, UserRole (YPMS adds
                              mfa_verified and assurance_level; drops
                              OWC-specific claimant_id)
- auth/deps.py                get_current_user() placeholder — real JWT
                              verify lands in 0.3

YPMS-specific additions on top of the vendored framework:

- framework/pii_audit.py      emit_pii_read() — NIST AU-14 / source RFP
                              C.5.6.9 #5. OWC doesn't need this because
                              its case-management surface is staff-only;
                              YPMS must audit reads of minors' PII, SSN,
                              banking, FERPA-covered OSSE records, and
                              CFSA foster/ward flags.

Bugfix vs. upstream OWC:

- framework/crud.py           Pagination `next_cursor` was previously the
                              peek-ahead row's id, which combined with
                              `where id > cursor` on the next page
                              silently dropped one row per boundary.
                              Caught by test_list_pagination_forwards_cursor.
                              Fixed here; noted in the module header so
                              re-vendoring OWC surfaces it upstream.

Migrations:

- 0002_framework_tables.py    Baseline for users, roles, user_roles,
                              permissions, audit_log, version_history.
                              Immutable once merged per CONTRIBUTING.md.
- migrations/env.py           Imports the new model modules so
                              autogenerate compares against them.

Tests (26 passing, 93.10% coverage, floor 80%):

- tests/framework/test_crud.py         CRUDService lifecycle + snapshots
                                       + audit emission (7 tests)
- tests/framework/test_bulk.py         BulkOps happy paths + failure
                                       reporting (4 tests)
- tests/framework/test_pagination.py   Page.to_dict serializer contract
                                       (2 tests)
- tests/framework/test_pii_audit.py    emit_pii_read row shape,
                                       anonymous case (2 tests)
- tests/security/test_rbac.py          can() + admin bypass + role union
                                       (4 tests)
- tests/test_readyz.py                 /readyz smoke (1 test)
- tests/test_logging.py                sanitize_for_log contract (3 tests)

Green locally: ruff clean, mypy clean (with a targeted override on
framework/router.py and framework/crud.py for TypeVar limitations that
OWC also accepts).

Advances YPMS-POAM-040. Prepares milestone 0.3 (JWT auth) and 0.4 (RBAC
seed) to plug into an already-live framework.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

tests/test_logging.py

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+"""Sensitive-field sanitizer strips known key names from log payloads."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from ypms.logging import sanitize_for_log
+
+
+def test_top_level_sensitive_keys_are_redacted() -> None:
+    out = sanitize_for_log({"username": "chris", "password": "hunter2", "ssn": "111-22-3333"})
+    assert out == {"username": "chris", "password": "REDACTED", "ssn": "REDACTED"}
+
+
+def test_nested_dicts_are_recursed() -> None:
+    out = sanitize_for_log(
+        {"outer": {"token": "xyz", "safe": 1}, "safe_top": True, "authorization": "Bearer x"}
+    )
+    assert out == {
+        "outer": {"token": "REDACTED", "safe": 1},
+        "safe_top": True,
+        "authorization": "REDACTED",
+    }
+
+
+def test_lists_are_left_alone() -> None:
+    # Design decision: no per-element recursion into lists. Callers that
+    # log lists of potentially-sensitive dicts should map through sanitize
+    # themselves. Keeps the helper's contract predictable.
+    out = sanitize_for_log({"users": [{"password": "x"}], "count": 1})
+    assert out == {"users": [{"password": "x"}], "count": 1}