YPMS/docs/coverage/registrant.md

Registrant — requirement coverage

Milestone: Phase 0 / 0.5 (vertical slice) · As of: 2026-09-30 Entity: Registrant (ARCHITECTURE.md §6.1) · RBAC entity string: Registrant

Traces each requirement the Registrant slice claims to the code and test that evidence it. Auditors: file paths are relative to ypms/.

---

Surface

Method	Path	Permission	Portal-only callers	PII-read audit
GET	/registrants	List	403	one pii_read row per page, after.ids = returned ids
GET	/registrants/{id}	View	own row only (YOUTH_USER); else 404	pii_read row, entity_id = id
POST	/registrants	Create	403	— (create audit row)
PATCH	/registrants/{id}	Edit	own row only (YOUTH_USER); else 404	— (update audit row)
DELETE	/registrants/{id}	Delete	403	— (delete audit row)
POST	/registrants/{id}/restore	Edit	403	— (restore audit row)
GET	/registrants/{id}/history	VersionHistory	403	pii_read row, entity_id = id

"Portal-only" = every role the caller holds is in {YOUTH_USER, PARENT_USER, HOST_USER}. A caller with any staff role gets staff behaviour. PARENT_USER sees no rows until the Guardian link lands (Phase 1). No bulk endpoints for Registrant in Phase 0.

---

Requirement trace

Requirement	What the code does	Evidence (code)	Evidence (test)
Source RFP C.5.3.1, C.5.3.4 — youth application / account management	Registrant CRUD with soft delete, restore, cursor pagination	src/ypms/youth/router.py	tests/youth/test_registrant_api.py
Source RFP C.5.7.50; ARCH §6.3 — SSN masked in display	Read schema exposes only ssn_masked (XXX-XX-1234); masking in the serializer, so API consumers see it too	src/ypms/youth/schemas.py (RegistrantRead), src/ypms/youth/models.py (ssn_masked)	test_create_masks_ssn_and_never_returns_it
NIST SC-28, SC-28(1); ARCH §6.3 — app-layer encryption of SSN	AES-256-GCM, HKDF-derived key, per-value nonce, column-bound AAD, versioned format; SSN is write-only on the model	src/ypms/security/column_crypto.py, src/ypms/youth/models.py (ssn setter, decrypt_ssn)	test_roundtrip_and_fresh_nonce, test_ciphertext_is_bound_to_column, test_ssn_is_write_only
NIST AU-2, AU-3, AU-12 — every state change audited	Create / update / delete / restore emit audit rows with actor, before, after	src/ypms/framework/crud.py	test_create_emits_redacted_audit_and_version_snapshot, test_update_bumps_version_and_audits, test_delete_requires_delete_permission_then_restore
NIST AU-14; source RFP C.5.6.9 #5 — record access to sensitive data	GET, list, and history emit pii_read rows with actor and client IP	src/ypms/framework/pii_audit.py, src/ypms/youth/router.py	test_get_emits_pii_read, test_list_emits_one_pii_read_with_ids, test_history_requires_version_history_permission
NIST AU-9 (protection of audit info) — no secrets in the audit trail	__audit_redact__ replaces ssn_encrypted with [REDACTED] in audit before/after and version-history snapshots	src/ypms/framework/crud.py (_to_dict), src/ypms/youth/models.py	test_create_emits_redacted_audit_and_version_snapshot, test_update_bumps_version_and_audits
NIST AC-3, AC-6 — least privilege	Data-driven RBAC per route; history gated on VersionHistory (not View); delete requires Delete (OYP_STAFF lacks it)	src/ypms/youth/router.py, src/ypms/seed/permissions_matrix.json	test_history_requires_version_history_permission, test_delete_requires_delete_permission_then_restore, test_host_user_denied
NIST AC-3 — row-level restriction for external users (Phase 0 minimum)	Portal-only callers limited to own row by user_id; out-of-scope → 404 (no id probing)	src/ypms/youth/router.py (_get_scoped, _require_staff)	test_youth_can_read_and_edit_only_own_row, test_youth_blocked_from_staff_routes, test_parent_sees_nothing_until_guardian_link
NIST SI-10 — input validation	SSN format + SSA never-issued ranges; DOB not in future; ZIP, email, length limits; NOT NULL fields can't be PATCHed to null; user_id not writable	src/ypms/youth/schemas.py	test_create_validation, test_update_rejects_null_on_required_field, test_update_cannot_set_user_id
ARCH §3 "minors first" — minor status	minor_flag derived from DOB at read time, never stored	src/ypms/youth/models.py (minor_flag, age_on)	test_minor_flag_derived_from_dob, test_age_on_boundaries
NIST CM-3; source RFP C.5.8.12 — schema change control	New immutable Alembic revision	migrations/versions/0003_registrants.py	rendered offline (alembic upgrade 0002_framework_tables:0003_registrants --sql); live Postgres run pending

---

Deferred (not in 0.5)

Item	Why deferred	Lands in
Banking columns (encrypted account, last-4)	Needs PAYROLL_ADMIN-only field scoping built alongside it; payroll vendor not selected (YPMS-POAM-052)	Payroll phase
SSN blind index (HMAC) for full-SSN dedupe/search	ssn_last4 covers Phase 0 display/search; dedupe is an intake concern	Phase 1 (application intake)
Search endpoint	Matrix grants Search; no route yet	Phase 1
Guardian-scoped access for PARENT_USER	Needs Guardian + ConsentRecord	Phase 1
Account-link flow setting user_id	Identity model open (YPMS-POAM-050)	Phase 1
Key Vault–backed key + v2 ciphertext	Phase 0 uses env-var key material	Phase 1 (YPMS-POAM-032)
Demographics, immigration-doc refs, tax elections	Not in PHASE0_PLAN §4 sketch	Phase 1+