Lands local password auth with JWT access + refresh tokens, and starts
carrying YPMS-specific claims (`uid`, `roles`, `iam.assurance_level`,
`mfa_verified`) so downstream authorization can gate high-risk actions
above base RBAC without a DB round-trip. Follows the OWC auth pattern
verbatim except where noted.
Added:
- src/ypms/auth/security.py hash_password / verify_password
(pbkdf2_sha256), create_access_token
with YPMS-specific claims,
create_refresh_token, decode_token
- src/ypms/auth/rate_limit.py SlidingWindow (vendored from OWC),
login_limiter tuned to NIST AC-7 /
source RFP C.5.7.10: 5 failed attempts
per IP per 15 minutes → 429 lockout
- src/ypms/auth/schemas.py LoginResponse, RefreshRequest,
RefreshResponse, ChangePasswordRequest,
UserRead
- src/ypms/auth/deps.py get_current_user replaces the milestone
0.2 stub; rejects refresh tokens on
resource endpoints; refuses inactive users
- src/ypms/auth/router.py POST /auth/login (OAuth2 form; audit-logs
successful auth; DOES_SYSTEM_ADMIN role
upgrades assurance_level to `admin` in
the token)
POST /auth/refresh (issues fresh access;
refuses non-refresh tokens)
GET /auth/me
POST /auth/change-password (self-service;
≥12 char floor; audit-logged)
- src/ypms/main.py Registers auth_router
Tests (43 passing, 93.47% coverage — up from 26 / 93.10%):
- tests/auth/test_security.py Token claims shape, refresh-vs-access
separation, invalid-token handling
(5 tests)
- tests/auth/test_router.py End-to-end via TestClient with a
dependency-overridden DB: login happy
path + wrong password + inactive user,
admin assurance upgrade, /me auth-gate,
refresh happy path + reject access token,
change-password full flow + length gate,
login lockout after 5 attempts (12 tests)
Test-infra fixes:
- tests/conftest.py Env defaults moved from a session-scoped
fixture to module-import time so
`ypms.main` (which builds the app at
import) can be transitively imported by
test modules without ValidationError on
Settings.
`db` fixture switched to StaticPool +
check_same_thread=False so TestClient's
worker thread sees the same in-memory
SQLite DB the fixture set up.
Notes:
- OWC includes an /auth/register for external users; that's out of scope
here — Phase 1 lands parental co-consent and youth/host registration,
which needs its own PIA-driven flow. Keeping /auth minimal in Phase 0.
- MFA is captured in `User.mfa_verified` and JWT claim but not enforced
yet; enforcement lands as an assurance-level gate in a later phase.
- Refresh flow returns only a new access token; refresh-token rotation
is a later hardening step.
Advances YPMS-POAM-040 and unblocks milestone 0.4 (RBAC seed) and 0.5
(Registrant vertical slice).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
